Penney's game is a two player zero-sum game in which each player chooses a three-flip pattern of heads and tails and the winner is the player whose pattern occurs first in repeated tosses of a fair coin. Because the players choose sequentially, the second mover has the advantage. In fact, for any three-flip pattern, there is another three-flip pattern that is strictly more likely to occur first. This paper provides a novel no-arbitrage argument that generates the winning odds corresponding to any pair of distinct patterns. The resulting odds formula is equivalent to that generated by Conway's "leading number" algorithm. The accompanying betting odds intuition adds insight into why Conway's algorithm works. The proof is simple and easy to generalize to games involving more than two outcomes, unequal probabilities, and competing patterns of various length. Additional results on the expected duration of Penney's game are presented. Code implementing and cross-validating the algorithms is included.
two-pattern match-up. Conway referred to it as the "leading number" algorithm, though he did not supply proof. Gardner wrote of the algorithm: "I have no idea why it works. It just cranks out the answer as if by magic, like so many of Conway's other algorithms" (Gardner, 2001, p. 306) .
While numerous proofs of Conway's algorithm now exist, they either employ advanced methods, or lack an immediately graspable intuition. 3, 4 This paper presents a simple and intuitive proof of an odds formula for one pattern occurring before another that is equivalent Conway's. For each pair of patterns we construct a trading strategy consisting of a sequence of concurrent bets on the underlying sequence of individual coin flip. Betting terminates the moment one of the two patterns occur generating a derivative bet on one of the patterns to occur before the other. If the bets on the individual flips receive fair odds (zero expected profits), a no-arbitrage argument guarantees that the trading strategy will receive fair odds as well. The odds formula for one of the patterns occurring before the other follows as an immediate consequence. The method of proof yields insight into why Conway's formula works and is readily generalized to games involving more than two outcomes, unequal probabilities, and competing patterns of various length. 5 The proof illustrates how a core economic concept, the idea that there is no such thing as a free lunch, can be used to illuminate problems in seemingly unrelated areas. In particular, the argument leverages the fact that a statistical arbitrage opportunity-a sequence of transactions that, in the limit, produce an investment that is costless, riskless, and has strictly positive profits-cannot exist for any trading strategy involving fairly priced financial assets. 6 The remainder of this draft proceeds as follows: In Section 2 we construct the trading strategy and apply a no-arbitrage argument to generate Penney's game odds for a simple numerical example, which is readily extended to a formula. Additionally, we detail the connection between the resulting formula and Conway's leading number algorithm. In Section 3 we generalize the result to games involving patterns of potentially different length and realizations of an arbitrary i.i.d. categorical variables. Appendix A presents the source code for the general formula, and for a simulation. Appendix B presents an interactive notebook session that cross-validates the formula with known results, and results from a simulation. 7
Penney's Game Odds: A Simple Proof
Imagine a casino invites gamblers to bet on a fair coin that it flips repeatedly (e.g. once per millisecond). The casino offers fair betting odds on each flip, paying out $2 for every $1 successfully bet. Ann, an investor, believes that she can construct a profitable trading strategy in which she sells side bets to the public and uses the proceeds to place bets with the casino.
Deriving the Odds in a Numerical Example
Suppose Ann sells to Bob a sequence of bets that anticipate pattern B=TTH ("short B") and then uses her proceeds from Bob to place a sequence of bets with the casino that anticipate pattern A=HTH ("long A"). Ann ceases betting the moment pattern A or pattern B occurs.
In particular, before each flip, in exchange for $1, Ann offers Bob a new contract in which she promises to pay Bob fair odds if he allows his $1 to be bet according to the pattern B = TTH for the next three flips of 3 See Nickerson (2007) for extensive coverage, including a simple intuition for how the second mover can construct an advantageous response, as well as additional history. 4 The proofs of Conway's algorithm have used combinatorial methods (Guibas and Odlyzko, 1981) , martingale optional stopping (Li, 1980) , Markov chain imbedding (Gerber and Li, 1981) , generating functions (Graham and Knuth, 1994, pp. 401-410) , as well as other approaches (Stefanov and Pakes, 1997) . The authors Li (1980) and Guibas and Odlyzko (1981) attribute the first proof to S. Collings, and a generalization to J.G. Wendel, both unpublished manuscripts. 5 The proof itself appears to be novel, though one component of the trading strategy is equivalent to a component of an argument used by Li (1980) in a proof of Solov'ev (1966) 's formula that yields the expected waiting time for a pattern in a sequence of coin flips. Li (1980) 's proof uses martingales; see Feller (1968, pp. 326-328) for an alternative proof using generating functions. 6 The term "statistical arbitrage" comes from Hogan et al. (2004) . The use of the term here is slightly different and is equivalent to Ross (1976)'s limiting arbitrage opportunity (for a discussion, see Chamberlain and Rothschild, 1983, p.1287) . In this setting this is equivalent to the fact that fair games preclude successful gambling policies (see footnote 8).
7 All code can be found at https://github.com/joshua-benjamin-miller/penneysgame. A rendered version of the Python notebook session can be found at: https://nbviewer.jupyter.org/github/joshua-benjaminmiller/penneysgame/blob/master/Validating- Penney.ipynb Figure 1: In the left cell, the sequence ends with HTH and pattern A occurs before pattern B; in this case, Ann's revenue from her (long) bets with the Casino that anticipate pattern A is $10 and her revenue from her (short) bets against Bob's pattern B is $0. In the right cell, the pattern B=TTH occurs first; Ann's profit is -$6. To illustrate, consider the upper-left portion of the left cell. An investment of $1 on bets that follow pattern A, initiated at flip n − 2 and reinvested, will grow to $8 after flip n when pattern A is realized. Next, an investment of $1 on bets that follow pattern A, initiated at flip n − 1 and reinvested, will be lost immediately, etc. the coin. On the first flip the $1 Bob invested is bet on T. If T occurs, then on the second flip the resulting $2 is bet on T. If T occurs again, then on the third flip the resulting $4 is bet on H. If H occurs on the third flip, then Ann returns $8 to Bob. If Bob's bet loses on any of these three flips, Bob's return is $0.
Suppose that Bob commits to every one of Ann's offers, i.e. Bob commits to paying Ann $1 in exchange for a new contract before each flip. Assume further that Ann takes this $1 and initiates, with the casino, her own sequence of bets that anticipate pattern A=HTH, until it occurs, or she loses the $1. The moment pattern A or B occurs, Ann plans to shut down all betting with both Bob and the casino. At that point she will pay Bob his winnings, if any, for his bet sequences with Ann, and collect her winnings, if any, from her bet sequences with the casino.
In Figure 1 , Ann's payoffs are illustrated for the two possible patterns that can terminate betting. The left panel explains why Ann's profit is $10 for the case in which pattern A = HTH occurs before pattern B = TTH. In this case, the outcomes on flip n − 2, n − 1, and n, are H, T, and H, respectively. After flip n, two of the three possible sequences of bets on pattern A are profitable. The first entry of the top row shows how Ann receives $8 from the casino for her $1 bet sequence initiated at flip n − 2, which she successfully reinvested two more times. The second entry shows how her $1 bet sequence initiated at flip n − 1 was lost due to being forced by her betting rule to bet on heads at flip n − 1. The third entry shows how her $1 bet sequence initiated at flip n yields $2 for the initial heads bet. In sum, Ann gains $10 from the casino for her pattern A bets in the case that pattern A occurs before pattern B. Importantly, Ann doesn't owe Bob any money for his bets in this case; the second row reveals how Bob eventually losses on each $1 invested at flip n − 2, n − 1, and n.
In the right panel Ann's profit of -$6 in the case that pattern B occurs before pattern A is explained. In this case Ann gains $2 from the casino for her single profitable sequence of bets initiated at flip n and loses $8 to Bob for his single profitable sequence of bets initiated at flip n − 2.
By using the proceeds from her short position on pattern B to self-finance her long position on pattern A, Ann has constructed a trading strategy in which she gains $10 if pattern A occurs before pattern B, and loses $6 otherwise. These payouts constitute the betting odds for going long on the event that pattern A occurs before pattern B. In particular, Ann stands to gain $10 for every $6 that she risks on pattern A, i.e. the betting odds are 10:6 against pattern A occurring before pattern B. Because both Ann and the casino have offered fair odds, Ann cannot expect to profit from her strategy, otherwise she would have a successful statistical arbitrage opportunity-i.e. if Ann's expected profits were positive then upon each occurrence of pattern A or B she could reinitiate her zero cost self-financing trading strategy. Because the expected profit would be positive each time she initiates, she would attain any amount of wealth with probability one (in the limit). 8 The necessity of Ann's zero expected profit condition forces her betting odds to be equal to the objective (probabilistic) odds. To illustrate the implications of this fact, let A ≺ B represent the event that pattern A occurs before pattern B. For the objective odds to reflect the 10:6 betting odds, it must be the case that there are 10 (objective) chances against the event for every 6 (objective) chances in its favor. This implies that the event A ≺ B has 6 chances in it's favor out of 16 total chances, which implies a probability of 6/16 = 3/8.
In effect, we have derived the probabilities associated with the risk-neutral valuation of Ann's trading strategy; in particular, we have solved for the probability that A occurs before B, P(A ≺ B), and the probability that B occurs before A, P(B ≺ A) = 1 − P(A ≺ B), in the following zero expected profit equation, which corresponds to a risk neutral investor who does not discount her payoffs 9
Ann's expected profit = 0
Generalizing the Example to a Formula for the Odds
In general, let P and P be any pair of three flip patterns. Define R P (P ) as the fair amount a bettor would receive on a sequence of flips ends at flip n with pattern P occurring, and a bet sequence anticipating pattern P were initiated before each flip n − 2, . . . , n-in the sense described above.
Using this definition, let A, B be the patterns chosen by Ann and Bob respectively. In the case that pattern A occurs first, R A (B) represents the amount Bob receives from Ann for his B-bets, while R A (A) represents that amount Ann receives from the casino for her A-bets. In the case that pattern B occurs first, R B (B) represents the amount Bob receives from Ann for his B-bets, while R B (A) represents the amount Ann receives from the casino for her A-bets. In sum, Ann's gains equal R A (A) − R A (B) if A occurs first, and her losses equal R B (B) − R B (A) if B occurs first. Assuming both the casino and Ann offer fair odds on each coin flip, then by the same logic used above, Ann must have zero expected profit. This implies that the objective (probabilistic) odds against the event that A occurs before B must satisfy:
Objective odds (and betting odds) against
Therefore, the probability of A occurring before B is equal to the chances in its favor divided by the total chances, i.e.:
Relationship with Conway's Leading Number Algorithm, and Further Insights
The formula in Equation 1 yields odds that are equivalent to the odds produced by Conway's leading number algorithm. This should not be a surprise because the payoff R A (B) measures the same pattern 8 Another way of demonstrating the necessity of this zero expected profit condition is to observe that Ann has constructed a "gambling policy" consisting of a "betting system" (long A, short B) and a stopping rule (stop at A or B). For any gambling policy composed of fair bets the expected fortune produced when betting stops must be equal to the initial fortune (Billingsley, 1995, pp.99-100) .. In Ann's case, her initial fortune is $0 9 While the possibility of positive expected profits on Ann's trading strategy does not create an opening for a classic (risk-free) arbitrage opportunity, we have nevertheless derived the risk-neutral probabilities associated with Ann's strategy in the following sense: Ann's gross return r satisfies r = 16/6 if A ≺ B and 0 otherwise, while the risk-free (gross) return is given byr = 1, therefore the risk neutral probabilities are determined by the condition E[r] =r, i.e.
P(A ≺ B)
16 6 = 1 (see e.g, LeRoy and Werner, 2003, pp.61-63). overlap properties that Conway's leading number measures, given any two patterns A, B. In particular, R A (B) measures how much is paid to the still active, and potentially overlapping, B-bet sequences if pattern A occurs first, with more weight given to the B-bet sequences that are initiated earlier. Just as with the Conway leading number, R A (B) is a measure of the degree to which the leading flips of pattern B overlap with the trailing flips of pattern A. In fact, it is easy to check that R A (B) = 2AB, where AB is the Conway leading number (see, e.g., Gardner, 2001, p. 307) . Therefore, the only difference between odds formula in Equation 1 and Conway's odds formula is that the chances against, and in favor, are double that of Conway's chances.
This betting odds representation of Conway's formula yields a simple intuition for why with two patterns such as A = HTH and B = TTH, pattern B is more likely to occur first. The more Ann would gain in the event that pattern A occurs before B, relative to what she would lose in the event that B occurs before A, the more unlikely it must be for A to occur before B in order to assure that she cannot construct an arbitrage between two fair games. This implies that the pattern A that is most likely to come before some given pattern B is the one that yields the least net gains to Ann when A occurs before B, relative her net (absolute) losses when B occurs before A. 10 While it is clear that this odds formula works for any two distinct coin flip patterns of any length, assuming one is not containing within the other, in the next section we extend it to realizations of an arbitrary i.i.d. categorical random variables.
Generalizing Penney's Game, and Conway's Leading Number Algorithm, to Arbitrary Categorical Random Variables
Penney's game odds can be generalized to arbitrary pairs of patterns and to any i.i.d sequence of a categorical random variable.
J, be two patterns of respective lengths k and k that do not overlap. Assume that the sequence stops at the first occurrence of pattern A or B; let τ refer to this stopping time.
For a bettor who anticipates pattern A or B, assume that a new sequence of $1 bets is initiated before each draw, in the sense of the previous section. If pattern A occurs before pattern B, i.e. A ≺ B, the fair payoff to someone betting according to B is equal to the sum of the fair payoffs arising from each reinvested bet sequence that is not bankrupt at time τ when outcome X τ = A k occurs. Because the final k draws of the sequence satisfy (X τ−k+1 , . . . , X τ ) = (A 1 , . . . , A k ), the fair (gross) return for a successful bet at each of these respective draws is given by
. Therefore, the fair payoffs to this bettor are given by the following character frequency-weighted measure of pattern overlap between the leading characters of B and the trailing characters of A:
This is a generalization of the Conway leading number. 11 The zero expected profit argument presented Section 2 applies directly in this setting, and therefore the odds against A occurring before B are given by Equation 1 with the corresponding probability of A occurring first given by Equation 2. 10 In particular, if Bob has chosen pattern B, Ann can easily find a pattern A to make her losses, R A (A) − R A (B), relatively small if she focuses first on making R A (B) large. To illustrate, let k ≥ 3 be the length of patterns chosen in the game, and B be Bob's chosen pattern. Ann can construct pattern A by making its trailing flips overlap as much as possible with the leading flips of B, i.e. by choosing an A, different from B in which its final k − 1 flips match the first k − 1 flips of B. Because Ann's losses if B occurs before A is given by R B (B) − R B (A) with R B (B) is fixed, then with the remaining single flip to choose she may simply choose it to make R A (A) small and R B (A) as small as possible.
11 Guibas and Odlyzko (1981) discuss a generalization of the Conway leading number in a setting in which there is a uniform distribution over the characters. They refer to this number as the correlation polynomial.
Additional Results
In this section we derive the expected time waiting for the game to end, and explore how the first mover's disadvantage depends on the probabilities.
Expected Length of Penney's Game
The generalized leading number R A (B) can be used to calculate the expected waiting time until pattern A or B occurs, for any two patterns A, B ∈ ∞ k=1 J k . The argument is a relatively straight forward adaptation and extension of an argument presented in Li (1980) . Suppose that a casino offers fair bets on a sequence {X t } of i.i.d. characters according to the categorical distribution above. The casino terminates betting the moment pattern A or B occurs. Further assume that Ann and Bob place bets with the casino according to pattern A and B, respectively. We show below that the expected waiting time until pattern A or B occurs at trial τ, is given by
where A ⊆ B represents the case in which A is a substring of B. The terms R A (A) and R A (B) represent Ann and Bob's respective payoffs if pattern A occurs first.
To see why this equation holds, note that when the casino stops offering bets at time τ, Ann and Bob will have each initiated τ bet sequences and will have paid the casino $τ each. Let R A∪B represent the total amount that the casino pays out to Ann and Bob when betting ends. Because the casino is offering a fair game, then by the argument present in the previous section (see, for example, Footnote 8), the casino's expected profits of must be equal to zero. With the expected profits given by E[2τ − R A∪B ], this implies that
, by linearity of expectations.
In the case that one pattern is a substring of the other, then betting will stop when the substring occurs, in which case Ann and Bob's bets perfectly overlap and the casino pays an identical amount to Ann and Bob, which implies that if
, and the expected waiting time is equal to the (known) payoff to Ann in this contingency. In the case that patterns are distinct and neither pattern is a substring of the other we can derive a formula for the expected waiting time until pattern A or B occurs:
Expression (3) follows because in the case of event A ≺ B, R A (A) is the amount paid to Ann and R A (B) is the amount paid to Bob, etc. Expression (4) follows by combining Expression (3) with Equation 2.
Optimal First Mover Choices
The resulting formulae can be used to investigate various aspects of Penney's game. For example, we can consider whether the first mover is always at a disadvantage.
Let Ann be the first mover, and Bob be the second mover. Ann assumes that Bob will best respond to her choice, i.e. he will maximize the probability that his pattern appears first. In Figure 2a the probability that Ann's pattern occurs before the Bob's pattern is plotted as a function of the probability of heads. As can be seen, when the probability of heads is sufficiently high, or low, Ann gains the advantage in Penney's game. In both plots, each of the first mover's potential choice of a three flip pattern is paired with the second mover's best response. The probability that the first mover's pattern appears first, and the decrease in expected time waiting for the game to end vs. waiting for the patter, are each plotted as a function of the probability of heads. Figure 2b reports the decrease in Ann's expected waiting time for the game to end vs. her expected waiting time for her chosen pattern. Unsurprisingly, the pattern that gives Ann the best chance of beating Bob's best response isn't expected to lead to a substantially shorter game when compared to the situation of Ann waiting alone for that pattern to occur.
Conclusion
In Penney's game the objective odds of the event that pattern A, say HTH, occurs before pattern B, say TTH has a simple representation using Conway's leading number algorithm, AA − AB:BB − BA. This suggests the possibility a simple explanation. We have constructed a simple trading strategy involving fair bets on coin flips that amounts to a bet on the event that A occurs before B. The absence of statistical arbitrage opportunities, in particular, the impossibility of generating positive expected profits in fair game, implies that the derived betting odds must equal the objective odds, yielding a simple formula for Penney's game odds. Importantly, the betting odds interpretation provided by the no-arbitrage argument offers novel insight into Penney's game and Conway's leading number algorithm. Further, the trading strategy is readily generalized to games involving more that two outcomes, unequal probabilities, and competing patterns of various length. This proof illustrates how a core principle of economics, the idea that there is no such thing as a free lunch, can yield insight in unexpected areas. If A=THH comes first, how much does a player who, on each trial, initiates a asequence of bets on characters according to B=HHH, get paid?
The players that arrive at time T-1 and time T walk out with $4 and $2 respectively, for a total of $6
In [17]: distribution={'H':.5, 'T':.5} A = "THH" B = "HHH" print(conway.payoff_to_B_bets_if_A_occurs_first(A, B, distribution)) 6.0
B.3.2 Let's test the generalized Conway leading number algorithm
Here is the function:
In [ What are the odds that that pattern A=HTH precedes pattern B=TTH?
In the case that A occurs before B, i.e we compare the trailing characters of A· * AA = 8 + 0 + 2 = 10 (the A-bets initiated at T − 2 and T are winners) * AB = 0 + 0 + 0 = 0 (the B-bets never win)
In the case that B occurs before A, i.e we compare the trailing characters of B· * BB = 8 + 0 + 0 = 8 (the B-bet inititiated at T − 2 is a winner) * BA = 0 + 0 + 2 = 2 (the A-bet initiated at T is a winner) so odds against A occuring before B are AA − AB : BB − BA = 10 : 6, or 5 : 3 this translates to a probability that A occurs first equal to 3/8
Let's check this below:
In [ 
B.4.1 Replicating original Penney's Game odds (patterns of length 3)
Let's create the table, the probability the row pattern comes before the column pattern, and cross-validate with table from Gardner 
C Application
What is the first mover's probability of winner if the second mover best responds, as a function of the probability of heads.
In probABs.append(None) min_probAB = min(p for p in probABs if p is not None) min_probs.append(min_probAB) min_prob_each_pattern.append (min_probs) What is the expected waiting time for the game to end given the first mover's strategy (when second mover best responds) vs. if the first mover were waiting alone for the pattern. #plot axis labels #plt.ylabel('Expected Proportion') #plt.xlabel('Number of shots')
